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SecurityprocessRequires audit policy

Windows Event ID 4688: A new process has been created

Security event 4688 logs every new process: executable, parent, account, elevation and, if enabled, the full command line. Off by default.

Overview

Event ID
4688
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Category
process
Enabled by default
No
How to enable
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Detailed Tracking > Audit Process Creation (Success). For command lines also enable Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events.

What event 4688 logs

Event 4688 is the native Windows record of process execution. Each record names the new executable (NewProcessName), the process that started it (ProcessId and, from Windows 10 / Server 2016, ParentProcessName), the account and logon session (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId), and the token it received (TokenElevationType, MandatoryLabel).

The most valuable field, CommandLine, is empty unless a separate policy is enabled: "Include command line in process creation events". Without it you know that powershell.exe ran but not what it ran. Enabling both the audit subcategory and the command-line policy turns 4688 into a lightweight alternative to Sysmon event 1 (which adds hashes and parent command line).

When the creator and the new process run under different logon sessions (for example a service launching a process as another user), the Target* fields name the account the process actually runs as; otherwise they are empty. SubjectLogonId / TargetLogonId tie each process back to its 4624 logon.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 4688, with the values that matter for investigation.

SubjectUserName

Account that created the process (the creator). HOST$ means SYSTEM or another machine-context service.

SubjectLogonId

Creator's logon session. Match it to TargetLogonId in 4624 to learn how the session started (interactive, RDP, network, service).

NewProcessId

Hexadecimal PID of the new process. Match it to ProcessId in 4689 for the exit, or to later child processes.

NewProcessName

Full path of the new executable. Check the folder as much as the name.

TokenElevationType

What kind of token the process received under UAC.

%%1936
Type 1, full token — UAC is off for this account, or the account is the built-in Administrator, a service account or SYSTEM.
%%1937
Type 2, elevated token — the user started the program with Run as administrator, or the program requires elevation and the user is an administrator.
%%1938
Type 3, limited token — UAC is on and the process runs with administrative rights stripped.
MandatoryLabel

Integrity level of the new process.

S-1-16-0
Untrusted.
S-1-16-4096
Low integrity (e.g. sandboxed browser processes).
S-1-16-8192
Medium integrity — standard user processes.
S-1-16-8448
Medium plus.
S-1-16-12288
High integrity — elevated administrator processes.
S-1-16-16384
System integrity — SYSTEM services.
S-1-16-20480
Protected process.
ProcessId

Hexadecimal PID of the creator (parent) process. PIDs are reused, so match it to the parent's own 4688 by time as well.

ParentProcessName

Full path of the creator process (Windows 10 / Server 2016 and later).

CommandLine

Full command line of the new process. Empty unless the command-line policy is enabled; check it first when it is present.

TargetUserName

Account the new process runs as when it differs from the creator's session; - when the creator and new process share the same logon.

TargetLogonId

Logon session of the new process when it differs from the creator's; 0x0 otherwise.

How to enable this event

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Detailed Tracking > Audit Process Creation (Success). For command lines also enable Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events.

Not enabled in the default audit policy. CommandLine exists from Windows 8.1 / Server 2012 R2 (event version 1); Target* fields, ParentProcessName and MandatoryLabel from Windows 10 / Server 2016 (version 2). Volume is high — plan log size and forwarding accordingly. Command lines can contain secrets typed as arguments.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Normal user and system activity — thousands of records per day per host, dominated by services, updaters and browsers.
  • Software deployment and management agents (SCCM, Intune, backup, monitoring) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe as SYSTEM.
  • Administrators running tools with Run as administrator, producing %%1937 elevated tokens.

Worth investigating

  • Living-off-the-land execution: powershell.exe with -enc or download cradles, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, certutil.exe used with unusual arguments.
  • Office applications, browsers or w3wp.exe spawning command interpreters — a common sign of malicious documents or web shells.
  • Remote execution artifacts on the target: children of services.exe with random names (PsExec-style), WmiPrvSE.exe spawning cmd.exe (WMI), wsmprovhost.exe (WinRM).
  • Discovery bursts from one session — whoami, net, nltest, ipconfig, systeminfo within seconds.
  • Executables running from user-writable locations such as %TEMP%, AppData, C:\ProgramData or C:\Users\Public.

Investigation notes

  • Rebuild the process tree with NewProcessId / ProcessId and ParentProcessName, remembering that PIDs are reused over time.
  • Group by SubjectLogonId to see everything a single session ran, then pivot to the 4624 that created that session to learn its origin.
  • Look for rare parent/child pairs across the fleet rather than individual suspicious names.
  • If CommandLine is empty everywhere, the command-line policy is off — fall back to Sysmon 1, PowerShell 4104 or EDR data.
  • Use 4689 with the same PID to get the exit time and duration of short-lived tools.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References