Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation
Sysmon event 1 logs every new process with full command line, hashes, parent process and a ProcessGuid for correlation. The backbone of endpoint hunting.
Overview
- Event ID
- 1
- Log / channel
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
- Category
- process
- Enabled by default
- No
- How to enable
- Sysmon installed; process creation is logged by default once Sysmon runs. Filter with
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include|exclude">rules in the Sysmon configuration.
What event 1 logs
Sysmon event 1 is written each time a process starts. Compared with Security event 4688 it is richer by default: the full CommandLine, the ParentImage and ParentCommandLine, file hashes, PE version information (OriginalFileName, Description, Company) and the IntegrityLevel all come in one record, without extra audit policy.
The key field is ProcessGuid. Process IDs are reused, but the GUID is unique per process instance, so it links this record to everything the process did afterwards in Sysmon: network connections (3), image loads (7), file creations (11), registry writes (12–14), DNS queries (22) and termination (5). ParentProcessGuid walks the tree upwards.
LogonId matches the TargetLogonId of the Security 4624 that created the session, which ties a process back to a logon type and source IP. On busy hosts event 1 is high volume; most configurations exclude well-known system and software-update processes.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 1, with the values that matter for investigation.
UtcTimeProcess start time in UTC, as recorded by Sysmon (independent of the event's TimeCreated).
ProcessGuidUnique ID of this process instance. Pivot on it across all Sysmon events.
ProcessIdPID of the new process. Reused by Windows, so prefer ProcessGuid for correlation.
ImageFull path of the executable. Check for system binary names running from user-writable folders.
OriginalFileNameInternal file name from the PE version resource. If it differs from the Image file name (for example Image is svchost.exe but OriginalFileName is PsExec.exe), the binary was renamed.
CommandLineFull command line. The most valuable field for spotting encoded PowerShell, LOLBins and tool arguments.
CurrentDirectoryWorking directory of the process; temp or public folders are worth a look.
UserAccount the process runs as, in DOMAIN\user form.
LogonIdLogon session of the process; matches TargetLogonId in Security 4624.
IntegrityLevelMandatory integrity level of the process token, e.g. Low, Medium, High (elevated administrator) or System.
HashesComma-separated hashes of the image, e.g. SHA256=...,IMPHASH=..., depending on HashAlgorithms. Use them for reputation lookups and fleet-wide prevalence.
ParentProcessGuidProcessGuid of the parent. Use it to rebuild the process tree.
ParentImagePath of the parent process. Unusual parent-child pairs are a classic detection.
ParentCommandLineCommand line of the parent, useful when the parent is a script host or service wrapper.
ParentUserAccount of the parent process (newer Sysmon versions).
How to enable this event
Sysmon installed; process creation is logged by default once Sysmon runs. Filter with <ProcessCreate onmatch="include|exclude"> rules in the Sysmon configuration.
Hashes is only filled when HashAlgorithms is configured (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, IMPHASH or *). ParentUser was added in later Sysmon versions; older logs lack it. Events live in Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational.
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
- Software updaters, installers (
msiexec.exe) and management agents spawning many short-lived processes. - Administrators running
cmd.exe,powershell.exeand built-in tools from an elevated console. - Scheduled tasks started by
svchost.exeand services started byservices.exe.
Worth investigating
- Office applications, browsers or PDF readers spawning
cmd.exe,powershell.exe,wscript.exe,mshta.exeorrundll32.exeafter a user opens a malicious document. - PowerShell with
-EncodedCommand,-nop -w hiddenor download cradles in the CommandLine. - Remote execution artifacts such as
wmiprvse.exespawningcmd.exe,services.exespawning a random binary fromC:\Windows, orPSEXESVC.exechildren. - Renamed tools where
OriginalFileNamedoes not match theImagename. - Credential dumping commands such as
rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpagainst LSASS.
Investigation notes
- Rebuild the process tree with ProcessGuid and ParentProcessGuid instead of PIDs.
- Look up
Hashesfor reputation and count how many hosts ran the same hash. - Pivot on ProcessGuid to events 3, 11, 13 and 22 to see what the process connected to, wrote and resolved.
- Match LogonId to Security 4624 to learn how the user logged on and from where.
- Compare
Imagepath,OriginalFileNameandCompanyto catch masquerading binaries.