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SysmonprocessRequires audit policy

Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation

Sysmon event 1 logs every new process with full command line, hashes, parent process and a ProcessGuid for correlation. The backbone of endpoint hunting.

Overview

Event ID
1
Log / channel
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Category
process
Enabled by default
No
How to enable
Sysmon installed; process creation is logged by default once Sysmon runs. Filter with <ProcessCreate onmatch="include|exclude"> rules in the Sysmon configuration.

What event 1 logs

Sysmon event 1 is written each time a process starts. Compared with Security event 4688 it is richer by default: the full CommandLine, the ParentImage and ParentCommandLine, file hashes, PE version information (OriginalFileName, Description, Company) and the IntegrityLevel all come in one record, without extra audit policy.

The key field is ProcessGuid. Process IDs are reused, but the GUID is unique per process instance, so it links this record to everything the process did afterwards in Sysmon: network connections (3), image loads (7), file creations (11), registry writes (12–14), DNS queries (22) and termination (5). ParentProcessGuid walks the tree upwards.

LogonId matches the TargetLogonId of the Security 4624 that created the session, which ties a process back to a logon type and source IP. On busy hosts event 1 is high volume; most configurations exclude well-known system and software-update processes.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 1, with the values that matter for investigation.

UtcTime

Process start time in UTC, as recorded by Sysmon (independent of the event's TimeCreated).

ProcessGuid

Unique ID of this process instance. Pivot on it across all Sysmon events.

ProcessId

PID of the new process. Reused by Windows, so prefer ProcessGuid for correlation.

Image

Full path of the executable. Check for system binary names running from user-writable folders.

OriginalFileName

Internal file name from the PE version resource. If it differs from the Image file name (for example Image is svchost.exe but OriginalFileName is PsExec.exe), the binary was renamed.

CommandLine

Full command line. The most valuable field for spotting encoded PowerShell, LOLBins and tool arguments.

CurrentDirectory

Working directory of the process; temp or public folders are worth a look.

User

Account the process runs as, in DOMAIN\user form.

LogonId

Logon session of the process; matches TargetLogonId in Security 4624.

IntegrityLevel

Mandatory integrity level of the process token, e.g. Low, Medium, High (elevated administrator) or System.

Hashes

Comma-separated hashes of the image, e.g. SHA256=...,IMPHASH=..., depending on HashAlgorithms. Use them for reputation lookups and fleet-wide prevalence.

ParentProcessGuid

ProcessGuid of the parent. Use it to rebuild the process tree.

ParentImage

Path of the parent process. Unusual parent-child pairs are a classic detection.

ParentCommandLine

Command line of the parent, useful when the parent is a script host or service wrapper.

ParentUser

Account of the parent process (newer Sysmon versions).

How to enable this event

Sysmon installed; process creation is logged by default once Sysmon runs. Filter with <ProcessCreate onmatch="include|exclude"> rules in the Sysmon configuration.

Hashes is only filled when HashAlgorithms is configured (MD5, SHA1, SHA256, IMPHASH or *). ParentUser was added in later Sysmon versions; older logs lack it. Events live in Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Software updaters, installers (msiexec.exe) and management agents spawning many short-lived processes.
  • Administrators running cmd.exe, powershell.exe and built-in tools from an elevated console.
  • Scheduled tasks started by svchost.exe and services started by services.exe.

Worth investigating

  • Office applications, browsers or PDF readers spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe or rundll32.exe after a user opens a malicious document.
  • PowerShell with -EncodedCommand, -nop -w hidden or download cradles in the CommandLine.
  • Remote execution artifacts such as wmiprvse.exe spawning cmd.exe, services.exe spawning a random binary from C:\Windows, or PSEXESVC.exe children.
  • Renamed tools where OriginalFileName does not match the Image name.
  • Credential dumping commands such as rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDump against LSASS.

Investigation notes

  • Rebuild the process tree with ProcessGuid and ParentProcessGuid instead of PIDs.
  • Look up Hashes for reputation and count how many hosts ran the same hash.
  • Pivot on ProcessGuid to events 3, 11, 13 and 22 to see what the process connected to, wrote and resolved.
  • Match LogonId to Security 4624 to learn how the user logged on and from where.
  • Compare Image path, OriginalFileName and Company to catch masquerading binaries.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References