Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess
Sysmon event 10 logs one process opening a handle to another, with the access mask and call stack. The go-to event for LSASS credential dumping.
Overview
- Event ID
- 10
- Log / channel
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
- Category
- process
- Enabled by default
- No
- How to enable
- Sysmon installed with a
<ProcessAccess>rule in the configuration, typically including TargetImagelsass.exeand excluding known security tools.
What event 10 logs
Sysmon event 10 records a process opening another process, with the rights it obtained (GrantedAccess) and the call stack that led to the open (CallTrace). Reading or writing another process's memory always starts with such a handle.
Its best-known use is detecting credential theft from lsass.exe: tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump or comsvcs.dll MiniDump must open LSASS with memory-read rights. The CallTrace adds context — a stack through dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll points to a minidump, and UNKNOWN frames mean the call came from memory not backed by a module, such as injected shellcode.
Unfiltered, the event is extremely noisy (security products and system processes open other processes constantly). Configure it for sensitive targets such as lsass.exe and exclude known scanners.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 10, with the values that matter for investigation.
SourceProcessGUIDGUID of the process that opened the handle (note the upper-case GUID in this event).
SourceProcessIdPID of the source process.
SourceThreadIdThread that opened the handle.
SourceImageExecutable of the source process.
TargetProcessGUIDGUID of the process that was opened.
TargetImageExecutable of the target, e.g. C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe.
GrantedAccessAccess mask granted. Bits of interest are PROCESS_VM_READ (0x10), PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x20), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x8) and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x2).
- 0x1000
- PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION only. Very common and usually benign.
- 0x1010
- Limited query + VM_READ. Enough to read LSASS memory; the classic mask of Mimikatz
sekurlsacommands. - 0x1410
- Query information + limited query + VM_READ. Also associated with credential dumping tools, but used by some legitimate software.
- 0x1438
- Query + VM_READ, VM_WRITE and VM_OPERATION — memory read and write, as used before injection.
- 0x1FFFFF
- PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS. Full control; suspicious against LSASS from anything but trusted tools.
CallTracePipe-separated stack of module+offset frames. Look for dbghelp.dll/dbgcore.dll (minidump), comsvcs.dll, or UNKNOWN frames (unbacked memory).
SourceUserAccount of the source process (newer Sysmon versions).
TargetUserAccount of the target process (newer Sysmon versions).
How to enable this event
Sysmon installed with a <ProcessAccess> rule in the configuration, typically including TargetImage lsass.exe and excluding known security tools.
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
- Antivirus/EDR,
MsMpEng.exe, and system processes such ascsrss.exe,wininit.exeandsvchost.exequerying LSASS. - Task Manager, Process Explorer and performance tools with query-only masks such as
0x1000. - Windows Error Reporting (
WerFault.exe) reading a crashing process.
Worth investigating
- Mimikatz or a clone opening
lsass.exewith0x1010or0x1410. rundll32.exeloadingcomsvcs.dlland calling MiniDump on LSASS, orprocdump.exe -ma lsass.exe, with a CallTrace throughdbghelp.dll/dbgcore.dll.- Injection preparation — a process gaining
0x1438or wider on another process before event 8.
Investigation notes
- Filter on TargetImage
lsass.exeand exclude a baseline of known SourceImage values. - Read the CallTrace;
UNKNOWNframes and minidump DLLs are strong indicators. - Pivot on SourceProcessGUID to event 1 and look for a dump file written by the same process (event 11).
- Follow up with the account's logons from other hosts (Security 4624, 4648) after the dump time.