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SysmonprocessRequires audit policy

Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess

Sysmon event 10 logs one process opening a handle to another, with the access mask and call stack. The go-to event for LSASS credential dumping.

Overview

Event ID
10
Log / channel
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Category
process
Enabled by default
No
How to enable
Sysmon installed with a <ProcessAccess> rule in the configuration, typically including TargetImage lsass.exe and excluding known security tools.

What event 10 logs

Sysmon event 10 records a process opening another process, with the rights it obtained (GrantedAccess) and the call stack that led to the open (CallTrace). Reading or writing another process's memory always starts with such a handle.

Its best-known use is detecting credential theft from lsass.exe: tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump or comsvcs.dll MiniDump must open LSASS with memory-read rights. The CallTrace adds context — a stack through dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll points to a minidump, and UNKNOWN frames mean the call came from memory not backed by a module, such as injected shellcode.

Unfiltered, the event is extremely noisy (security products and system processes open other processes constantly). Configure it for sensitive targets such as lsass.exe and exclude known scanners.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 10, with the values that matter for investigation.

SourceProcessGUID

GUID of the process that opened the handle (note the upper-case GUID in this event).

SourceProcessId

PID of the source process.

SourceThreadId

Thread that opened the handle.

SourceImage

Executable of the source process.

TargetProcessGUID

GUID of the process that was opened.

TargetImage

Executable of the target, e.g. C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe.

GrantedAccess

Access mask granted. Bits of interest are PROCESS_VM_READ (0x10), PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x20), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x8) and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x2).

0x1000
PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION only. Very common and usually benign.
0x1010
Limited query + VM_READ. Enough to read LSASS memory; the classic mask of Mimikatz sekurlsa commands.
0x1410
Query information + limited query + VM_READ. Also associated with credential dumping tools, but used by some legitimate software.
0x1438
Query + VM_READ, VM_WRITE and VM_OPERATION — memory read and write, as used before injection.
0x1FFFFF
PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS. Full control; suspicious against LSASS from anything but trusted tools.
CallTrace

Pipe-separated stack of module+offset frames. Look for dbghelp.dll/dbgcore.dll (minidump), comsvcs.dll, or UNKNOWN frames (unbacked memory).

SourceUser

Account of the source process (newer Sysmon versions).

TargetUser

Account of the target process (newer Sysmon versions).

How to enable this event

Sysmon installed with a <ProcessAccess> rule in the configuration, typically including TargetImage lsass.exe and excluding known security tools.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Antivirus/EDR, MsMpEng.exe, and system processes such as csrss.exe, wininit.exe and svchost.exe querying LSASS.
  • Task Manager, Process Explorer and performance tools with query-only masks such as 0x1000.
  • Windows Error Reporting (WerFault.exe) reading a crashing process.

Worth investigating

  • Mimikatz or a clone opening lsass.exe with 0x1010 or 0x1410.
  • rundll32.exe loading comsvcs.dll and calling MiniDump on LSASS, or procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe, with a CallTrace through dbghelp.dll/dbgcore.dll.
  • Injection preparation — a process gaining 0x1438 or wider on another process before event 8.

Investigation notes

  • Filter on TargetImage lsass.exe and exclude a baseline of known SourceImage values.
  • Read the CallTrace; UNKNOWN frames and minidump DLLs are strong indicators.
  • Pivot on SourceProcessGUID to event 1 and look for a dump file written by the same process (event 11).
  • Follow up with the account's logons from other hosts (Security 4624, 4648) after the dump time.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References