Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread
Sysmon event 8 fires when a process creates a thread in another process — a classic code injection technique. Low volume, high signal.
Overview
- Event ID
- 8
- Log / channel
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
- Category
- process
- Enabled by default
- No
- How to enable
- Sysmon installed; filter with
<CreateRemoteThread>rules in the configuration.
What event 8 logs
Sysmon event 8 records one process starting a thread inside another process. That is how many injection techniques get their code to run: allocate memory in the target, write a payload, then start a remote thread on it.
The event names the source and target processes and describes where the new thread starts: StartAddress, and when Sysmon can infer them, StartModule and StartFunction. A start function of LoadLibraryA or LoadLibraryW means a DLL is being injected; an empty StartModule means the thread starts in memory not backed by a loaded module, which is typical of shellcode.
Legitimate remote threads exist but are few, so the event is usually worth reviewing in full after excluding known pairs.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 8, with the values that matter for investigation.
SourceProcessGuidProcess that created the thread.
SourceImageExecutable of the injecting process.
TargetProcessGuidProcess that received the thread.
TargetImageExecutable of the target. Injection into lsass.exe, explorer.exe, svchost.exe or browsers is common.
NewThreadIdID of the new thread in the target.
StartAddressAddress where the thread starts.
StartModuleModule containing StartAddress, when known. Empty means unbacked memory.
StartFunctionExported function at StartAddress, when known (e.g. LoadLibraryW).
SourceUserAccount of the source process (newer Sysmon versions).
TargetUserAccount of the target process (newer Sysmon versions).
How to enable this event
Sysmon installed; filter with <CreateRemoteThread> rules in the configuration.
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
csrss.execreating threads in console processes on Ctrl+C / Ctrl+Break (StartFunctionCtrlRoutine).- Debuggers, accessibility and some security or monitoring tools.
Worth investigating
- Malware injecting a DLL (StartFunction
LoadLibraryA/LoadLibraryW) intoexplorer.exeor a browser. - Shellcode injection with an empty StartModule into a long-lived process for stealth.
- Post-exploitation frameworks migrating into another process.
Investigation notes
- Pivot on SourceProcessGuid to event 1 to see how the injector started.
- Look for event 10 from the same source to the same target just before (memory write access).
- Check the target's later network (3) and DNS (22) activity to see what the injected code did.