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SysmonprocessRequires audit policy

Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread

Sysmon event 8 fires when a process creates a thread in another process — a classic code injection technique. Low volume, high signal.

Overview

Event ID
8
Log / channel
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Category
process
Enabled by default
No
How to enable
Sysmon installed; filter with <CreateRemoteThread> rules in the configuration.

What event 8 logs

Sysmon event 8 records one process starting a thread inside another process. That is how many injection techniques get their code to run: allocate memory in the target, write a payload, then start a remote thread on it.

The event names the source and target processes and describes where the new thread starts: StartAddress, and when Sysmon can infer them, StartModule and StartFunction. A start function of LoadLibraryA or LoadLibraryW means a DLL is being injected; an empty StartModule means the thread starts in memory not backed by a loaded module, which is typical of shellcode.

Legitimate remote threads exist but are few, so the event is usually worth reviewing in full after excluding known pairs.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 8, with the values that matter for investigation.

SourceProcessGuid

Process that created the thread.

SourceImage

Executable of the injecting process.

TargetProcessGuid

Process that received the thread.

TargetImage

Executable of the target. Injection into lsass.exe, explorer.exe, svchost.exe or browsers is common.

NewThreadId

ID of the new thread in the target.

StartAddress

Address where the thread starts.

StartModule

Module containing StartAddress, when known. Empty means unbacked memory.

StartFunction

Exported function at StartAddress, when known (e.g. LoadLibraryW).

SourceUser

Account of the source process (newer Sysmon versions).

TargetUser

Account of the target process (newer Sysmon versions).

How to enable this event

Sysmon installed; filter with <CreateRemoteThread> rules in the configuration.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • csrss.exe creating threads in console processes on Ctrl+C / Ctrl+Break (StartFunction CtrlRoutine).
  • Debuggers, accessibility and some security or monitoring tools.

Worth investigating

  • Malware injecting a DLL (StartFunction LoadLibraryA/LoadLibraryW) into explorer.exe or a browser.
  • Shellcode injection with an empty StartModule into a long-lived process for stealth.
  • Post-exploitation frameworks migrating into another process.

Investigation notes

  • Pivot on SourceProcessGuid to event 1 to see how the injector started.
  • Look for event 10 from the same source to the same target just before (memory write access).
  • Check the target's later network (3) and DNS (22) activity to see what the injected code did.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References