Sysmon Event ID 7: Image loaded
Sysmon event 7 logs a DLL or other module loaded into a process, with hashes and signature. Used to catch DLL side-loading and unusual module loads.
Overview
- Event ID
- 7
- Log / channel
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
- Category
- process
- Enabled by default
- No
- How to enable
- Sysmon installed with image load monitoring enabled (
-lswitch or an<ImageLoad>rule in the configuration). Use narrow include rules; logging all loads is very noisy.
What event 7 logs
Sysmon event 7 records a module being mapped into a process: the host process (Image), the loaded file (ImageLoaded), its hashes, version information and signature status.
Logging every module load would produce enormous volume, so the event is off by default and must be targeted. Typical rules watch for specific DLLs loaded by unexpected processes (for example the PowerShell automation DLL loaded outside PowerShell, or dbghelp.dll / dbgcore.dll loaded by a tool that then touches LSASS), and for unsigned DLLs loaded from user-writable folders.
For DLL side-loading, the telltale pattern is a signed legitimate executable running from an unusual folder and loading an unsigned DLL from the same folder.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 7, with the values that matter for investigation.
ProcessGuidProcess that loaded the module; pivot to its event 1.
ImageExecutable of the loading process.
ImageLoadedFull path of the loaded module.
OriginalFileNameInternal name of the module from its version resource; reveals renamed DLLs.
HashesHashes of the loaded module.
Signedtrue or false: whether the module is signed.
SignatureSigner of the module.
SignatureStatusValidation result of the signature, e.g. Valid.
UserAccount of the loading process (newer Sysmon versions).
How to enable this event
Sysmon installed with image load monitoring enabled (-l switch or an <ImageLoad> rule in the configuration). Use narrow include rules; logging all loads is very noisy.
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
- Applications loading their own DLLs from their install folders.
- Security and monitoring products injecting their modules into many processes.
Worth investigating
- DLL side-loading — a signed executable copied to
ProgramDataor%TEMP%loading an unsigned DLL placed next to it. System.Management.Automation.dllloaded into a process that is not PowerShell (unmanaged PowerShell).clr.dllloaded into unusual native processes, a sign of in-memory .NET assembly execution.- Credential dumping tools loading
dbghelp.dllordbgcore.dllbefore opening LSASS (event 10).
Investigation notes
- Check
Signedand path ofImageLoadedagainst the path ofImage. - Pivot on ProcessGuid to event 1 (parent, command line) and event 10 (process access).
- Count the hash of
ImageLoadedacross the fleet; one-off DLLs in common product folders stand out.