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SysmonprocessRequires audit policy

Sysmon Event ID 7: Image loaded

Sysmon event 7 logs a DLL or other module loaded into a process, with hashes and signature. Used to catch DLL side-loading and unusual module loads.

Overview

Event ID
7
Log / channel
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Category
process
Enabled by default
No
How to enable
Sysmon installed with image load monitoring enabled (-l switch or an <ImageLoad> rule in the configuration). Use narrow include rules; logging all loads is very noisy.

What event 7 logs

Sysmon event 7 records a module being mapped into a process: the host process (Image), the loaded file (ImageLoaded), its hashes, version information and signature status.

Logging every module load would produce enormous volume, so the event is off by default and must be targeted. Typical rules watch for specific DLLs loaded by unexpected processes (for example the PowerShell automation DLL loaded outside PowerShell, or dbghelp.dll / dbgcore.dll loaded by a tool that then touches LSASS), and for unsigned DLLs loaded from user-writable folders.

For DLL side-loading, the telltale pattern is a signed legitimate executable running from an unusual folder and loading an unsigned DLL from the same folder.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 7, with the values that matter for investigation.

ProcessGuid

Process that loaded the module; pivot to its event 1.

Image

Executable of the loading process.

ImageLoaded

Full path of the loaded module.

OriginalFileName

Internal name of the module from its version resource; reveals renamed DLLs.

Hashes

Hashes of the loaded module.

Signed

true or false: whether the module is signed.

Signature

Signer of the module.

SignatureStatus

Validation result of the signature, e.g. Valid.

User

Account of the loading process (newer Sysmon versions).

How to enable this event

Sysmon installed with image load monitoring enabled (-l switch or an <ImageLoad> rule in the configuration). Use narrow include rules; logging all loads is very noisy.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Applications loading their own DLLs from their install folders.
  • Security and monitoring products injecting their modules into many processes.

Worth investigating

  • DLL side-loading — a signed executable copied to ProgramData or %TEMP% loading an unsigned DLL placed next to it.
  • System.Management.Automation.dll loaded into a process that is not PowerShell (unmanaged PowerShell).
  • clr.dll loaded into unusual native processes, a sign of in-memory .NET assembly execution.
  • Credential dumping tools loading dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll before opening LSASS (event 10).

Investigation notes

  • Check Signed and path of ImageLoaded against the path of Image.
  • Pivot on ProcessGuid to event 1 (parent, command line) and event 10 (process access).
  • Count the hash of ImageLoaded across the fleet; one-off DLLs in common product folders stand out.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References