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SecurityaccountEnabled by default

Windows Event ID 4720: A user account was created

Security event 4720 records the creation of a local or domain user account: who created it, the new name and SID, and its initial attributes.

Overview

Event ID
4720
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Category
account
Enabled by default
Yes
How to enable
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Management > Audit User Account Management (Success). Enabled for Success in the default Windows audit policy.

What event 4720 logs

Event 4720 is written each time a new user object is created. For a local account it is logged on the workstation or server that owns the SAM database; for a domain account it is logged on the domain controller that processed the request. The Subject* fields identify who created the account, the Target* fields identify the new account.

The rest of the record is a snapshot of the initial attributes: SamAccountName, UserPrincipalName, PrimaryGroupId, SidHistory, AllowedToDelegateTo and the SAM account flags in NewUacValue and UserAccountControl. An account created through Active Directory Users and Computers typically starts disabled with no password set (NewUacValue 0x15), so the creation is usually followed within seconds by 4724 (password set), 4722 (enabled) and one or more 4738 events.

Account creation is rare enough that most organizations review every 4720. Pay special attention to local accounts created on servers and workstations, accounts created outside the normal provisioning process, and new accounts that are quickly added to privileged groups (4728, 4732, 4756).

Fields

Every field recorded in event 4720, with the values that matter for investigation.

SubjectUserName

Account that created the new user. Compare against your list of identity administrators and provisioning service accounts.

SubjectDomainName

Domain (or computer name for local accounts) of the creator.

SubjectLogonId

Logon session of the creator. Pivot to 4624 with the same TargetLogonId to learn where and how the creator logged on.

TargetUserName

Name of the new account.

TargetDomainName

Domain of the new account, or the computer name when a local account was created.

TargetSid

SID of the new account. Use it to follow the account through later events even if it is renamed (4781).

SamAccountName

Pre-Windows 2000 logon name. An empty value or - is abnormal.

UserPrincipalName

UPN of a domain account (user@domain). Always - for local accounts.

PrimaryGroupId

RID of the primary group. 513 (Domain Users, or Users for local accounts) is normal; anything else deserves a look.

NewUacValue

SAM account flags of the new account in hexadecimal (the SAM definition, which differs from the Active Directory userAccountControl bit values). OldUacValue is always 0x0 for new accounts.

0x1
Account disabled.
0x4
Password not required.
0x10
Normal user account.
0x200
Password never expires.
0x2000
Trusted for delegation (unconstrained Kerberos delegation).
0x10000
Kerberos pre-authentication not required.
0x15
Typical value for an account created in Active Directory Users and Computers — disabled, password not required, normal account.
UserAccountControl

The same flags rendered as message codes, e.g. %%2080 %%2082 %%2084 for 0x15 (Account Disabled, Password Not Required, Normal Account).

SidHistory

Previous SIDs of a migrated account. Should be - for a freshly created account.

AllowedToDelegateTo

SPNs the account may delegate to (constrained delegation). Normally - on creation.

PrivilegeList

Privileges used for the operation, often -.

How to enable this event

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Management > Audit User Account Management (Success). Enabled for Success in the default Windows audit policy.

Logged on domain controllers for domain accounts and on member servers and workstations for local accounts, so local account creation is only visible in the endpoint's own Security log. Several attributes may appear as - when they were not captured, and local accounts show <value not set> for many of them.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Helpdesk or identity management systems provisioning new employees, usually from a small set of admin or service accounts.
  • Software installers and management agents that create local service accounts.
  • Domain controller promotion, migrations and lab builds creating many accounts in a burst.

Worth investigating

  • Persistence by creating a local account on a compromised host, often with net user <name> <password> /add followed by adding it to the local Administrators group (4732).
  • Creating a domain account and adding it to Domain Admins or another privileged group (4728, 4756).
  • Account names chosen to blend in, such as look-alikes of service or admin accounts, or names ending in $ to resemble computer accounts.

Investigation notes

  • Check whether SubjectUserName is an expected provisioning account and whether the creation matches a ticket or HR onboarding.
  • Look for group membership changes for the same TargetSid right after creation (4728, 4732, 4756) and for its first logon (4624).
  • Pivot on SubjectLogonId to find the creator's logon (4624) and, if process auditing is on, the process that did it (4688, e.g. net.exe, net1.exe or PowerShell).
  • Review the initial attributes for unusual values — non-513 PrimaryGroupId, SidHistory, delegation settings or pre-authentication disabled.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References