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SecurityntlmEnabled by default

Windows Event ID 4776: The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account

Event 4776 records an NTLM credential check: on the domain controller for domain accounts, on the local machine for local accounts.

Overview

Event ID
4776
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Category
ntlm
Enabled by default
Yes
How to enable
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Credential Validation (Success, Failure). Success is audited by default on servers; enable Failure explicitly.

What event 4776 logs

Event 4776 is written by the computer that is authoritative for the account when it validates credentials with NTLM: the domain controller for domain accounts, or the local machine for local accounts (SAM). It fires for successes and failures, and the Status field says which.

It fills the gap left by Kerberos events: NTLM logons do not produce 4768/4769, so on a DC 4776 is the only record of an NTLM authentication. The Workstation field is the client-supplied name of the source computer — there is no IP address, so map it back through 4624 on the target server.

Pass-the-hash and relay attacks use NTLM, so bursts of NTLM validations for privileged accounts, or from unexpected workstations, deserve attention.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 4776, with the values that matter for investigation.

PackageName

Authentication package, normally MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0.

TargetUserName

Account whose credentials were validated.

Workstation

Name of the client computer as supplied in the NTLM exchange (spoofable, may be empty).

Status

Result (NTSTATUS).

0x0
Success.
0xC0000064
User name does not exist.
0xC000006A
Wrong password.
0xC000006F
Logon outside allowed hours.
0xC0000070
Workstation restriction.
0xC0000071
Password expired.
0xC0000072
Account disabled.
0xC0000193
Account expired.
0xC0000224
User must change password at next logon.
0xC0000234
Account locked out.

How to enable this event

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Credential Validation (Success, Failure). Success is audited by default on servers; enable Failure explicitly.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Applications and devices that only speak NTLM (older NAS, printers, some web apps).
  • Logons by IP address instead of host name, which fall back to NTLM.
  • Local account logons on standalone machines.

Worth investigating

  • Pass-the-hash — NTLM validations for admin accounts from workstations that normally use Kerberos.
  • NTLM password spraying — many accounts failing with 0xC000006A from the same Workstation name.
  • NTLM relay — validations for an account arriving from a machine that is not where the user is.

Investigation notes

  • On DCs, group by TargetUserName and Workstation; look for privileged accounts authenticating via NTLM.
  • For failures, compare 0xC0000064 versus 0xC000006A counts to separate enumeration from guessing.
  • Find the matching 4624 (AuthenticationPackageName NTLM) on member servers to recover the source IP.
  • Consider NTLM auditing (NTLM operational log 8001–8004) to see which servers still receive NTLM.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References