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SecuritykerberosEnabled by default

Windows Event ID 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested

Domain controller event 4768 records every Kerberos TGT request: the account, client IP, encryption type, pre-authentication type and result.

Overview

Event ID
4768
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Category
kerberos
Enabled by default
Yes
How to enable
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service (Success, and Failure for failed requests). Only meaningful on domain controllers.

What event 4768 logs

Event 4768 is logged by the Key Distribution Center on a domain controller each time an account asks for a Ticket Granting Ticket — the first step of every Kerberos domain logon. User logons, computer startups and services running as domain accounts all generate it.

For forensics it is the DC-side proof that an account authenticated, and from which IP (IpAddress). The TicketEncryptionType and PreAuthType fields expose weak or unusual authentication: RC4 where the domain uses AES, or pre-authentication type 0, meaning the account does not require Kerberos pre-authentication and is exposed to AS-REP roasting.

Failed TGT requests are logged as 4768 with a non-zero Status (for unknown or revoked accounts); a wrong password produces 4771 instead.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 4768, with the values that matter for investigation.

TargetUserName

Account that requested the TGT (user or computer account ending in $).

TargetDomainName

Kerberos realm (domain) supplied by the client.

TargetSid

SID of the account, when it exists.

ServiceName

Always krbtgt for a TGT request.

TicketOptions

Kerberos ticket option flags requested (hex), e.g. 0x40810010 for a typical Windows client.

Status

Kerberos result code.

0x0
Success — a TGT was issued.
0x6
KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN — the user name does not exist.
0x12
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED — account disabled, expired or locked out.
0x17
KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED — the password has expired.
0x25
KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW — clock skew too large between client and DC.
TicketEncryptionType

Encryption type of the issued ticket.

0x11
AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
0x12
AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 — normal in modern domains.
0x17
RC4-HMAC — legacy; suspicious when the account and domain support AES.
0x18
RC4-HMAC-EXP
0x1
DES-CBC-CRC (disabled by default since Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2).
0x3
DES-CBC-MD5 (disabled by default since Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2).
0xffffffff
No ticket issued (failure).
PreAuthType

Pre-authentication method used.

0
No pre-authentication — the account has "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" set.
2
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP — standard password-based logon.
15
PA-PK-AS-REP_OLD — smart card logon.
16
PA-PK-AS-REQ — smart card / certificate logon.
138
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE — Kerberos armoring (FAST).
IpAddress

Client IP address (IPv4 addresses may appear as ::ffff:10.0.0.5).

IpPort

Client source port.

CertIssuerName

For certificate logons, the issuing CA — useful when investigating certificate abuse.

CertThumbprint

Thumbprint of the certificate used for PKINIT logons.

How to enable this event

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service (Success, and Failure for failed requests). Only meaningful on domain controllers.

High volume on DCs. Enable Failure auditing explicitly if you want failed requests; check the effective policy with auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Authentication Service".

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Every domain user and computer logon; computers renew their TGT regularly.
  • Service accounts authenticating when services or scheduled tasks start.
  • Certificate-based (smart card, Windows Hello for Business) logons with PreAuthType 16.

Worth investigating

  • AS-REP roasting — TGT requests with PreAuthType 0 for accounts that do not require pre-authentication, often RC4 (0x17), from a host that is not the user's.
  • A stolen password or hash used from a new IP address — the TGT request is the first DC-side trace.
  • User enumeration against Kerberos — bursts of Status 0x6 for many names from one IP.
  • Certificate abuse (for example certificates obtained through AD CS misconfigurations) shows as PKINIT logons with unexpected CertIssuerName or CertThumbprint.

Investigation notes

  • Build a per-account baseline of client IPs; a TGT for a privileged account from a workstation never used before is a lead.
  • Hunt for PreAuthType 0 and list which accounts have pre-authentication disabled.
  • Flag RC4 (0x17) tickets in domains where AES is standard, then check who requested them.
  • Follow the same account and IP to 4769 (service tickets) to see which services it accessed after authenticating.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References