Windows Event ID 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested
Domain controller event 4768 records every Kerberos TGT request: the account, client IP, encryption type, pre-authentication type and result.
Overview
- Event ID
- 4768
- Log / channel
- Security
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- Category
- kerberos
- Enabled by default
- Yes
- How to enable
- Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service (Success, and Failure for failed requests). Only meaningful on domain controllers.
What event 4768 logs
Event 4768 is logged by the Key Distribution Center on a domain controller each time an account asks for a Ticket Granting Ticket — the first step of every Kerberos domain logon. User logons, computer startups and services running as domain accounts all generate it.
For forensics it is the DC-side proof that an account authenticated, and from which IP (IpAddress). The TicketEncryptionType and PreAuthType fields expose weak or unusual authentication: RC4 where the domain uses AES, or pre-authentication type 0, meaning the account does not require Kerberos pre-authentication and is exposed to AS-REP roasting.
Failed TGT requests are logged as 4768 with a non-zero Status (for unknown or revoked accounts); a wrong password produces 4771 instead.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 4768, with the values that matter for investigation.
TargetUserNameAccount that requested the TGT (user or computer account ending in $).
TargetDomainNameKerberos realm (domain) supplied by the client.
TargetSidSID of the account, when it exists.
ServiceNameAlways krbtgt for a TGT request.
TicketOptionsKerberos ticket option flags requested (hex), e.g. 0x40810010 for a typical Windows client.
StatusKerberos result code.
- 0x0
- Success — a TGT was issued.
- 0x6
- KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN — the user name does not exist.
- 0x12
- KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED — account disabled, expired or locked out.
- 0x17
- KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED — the password has expired.
- 0x25
- KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW — clock skew too large between client and DC.
TicketEncryptionTypeEncryption type of the issued ticket.
- 0x11
- AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
- 0x12
- AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 — normal in modern domains.
- 0x17
- RC4-HMAC — legacy; suspicious when the account and domain support AES.
- 0x18
- RC4-HMAC-EXP
- 0x1
- DES-CBC-CRC (disabled by default since Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2).
- 0x3
- DES-CBC-MD5 (disabled by default since Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2).
- 0xffffffff
- No ticket issued (failure).
PreAuthTypePre-authentication method used.
- 0
- No pre-authentication — the account has "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" set.
- 2
- PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP — standard password-based logon.
- 15
- PA-PK-AS-REP_OLD — smart card logon.
- 16
- PA-PK-AS-REQ — smart card / certificate logon.
- 138
- PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE — Kerberos armoring (FAST).
IpAddressClient IP address (IPv4 addresses may appear as ::ffff:10.0.0.5).
IpPortClient source port.
CertIssuerNameFor certificate logons, the issuing CA — useful when investigating certificate abuse.
CertThumbprintThumbprint of the certificate used for PKINIT logons.
How to enable this event
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service (Success, and Failure for failed requests). Only meaningful on domain controllers.
High volume on DCs. Enable Failure auditing explicitly if you want failed requests; check the effective policy with auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Authentication Service".
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
- Every domain user and computer logon; computers renew their TGT regularly.
- Service accounts authenticating when services or scheduled tasks start.
- Certificate-based (smart card, Windows Hello for Business) logons with PreAuthType 16.
Worth investigating
- AS-REP roasting — TGT requests with PreAuthType
0for accounts that do not require pre-authentication, often RC4 (0x17), from a host that is not the user's. - A stolen password or hash used from a new IP address — the TGT request is the first DC-side trace.
- User enumeration against Kerberos — bursts of Status
0x6for many names from one IP. - Certificate abuse (for example certificates obtained through AD CS misconfigurations) shows as PKINIT logons with unexpected CertIssuerName or CertThumbprint.
Investigation notes
- Build a per-account baseline of client IPs; a TGT for a privileged account from a workstation never used before is a lead.
- Hunt for PreAuthType 0 and list which accounts have pre-authentication disabled.
- Flag RC4 (
0x17) tickets in domains where AES is standard, then check who requested them. - Follow the same account and IP to 4769 (service tickets) to see which services it accessed after authenticating.