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SecuritykerberosEnabled by default

Windows Event ID 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested

Event 4769 is logged on domain controllers for every Kerberos service ticket (TGS) request — the key record for spotting Kerberoasting.

Overview

Event ID
4769
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Category
kerberos
Enabled by default
Yes
How to enable
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Success, Failure). Only meaningful on domain controllers.

What event 4769 logs

Event 4769 is written by the KDC on a domain controller when an account that already holds a TGT asks for a ticket to a specific service (a Ticket Granting Service request). Every access to a Kerberos-protected resource — file shares, SQL Server, HTTP with Windows authentication, LDAP, other hosts — produces one.

The ServiceName field shows which service account the ticket is for, and TicketEncryptionType shows how it is encrypted. That combination is how Kerberoasting is found: an attacker requests tickets for user accounts that have an SPN, preferably RC4-encrypted (0x17) because they crack faster offline. Requests like that for many services in a short time, from one account, are the classic signature.

Volume is very high on DCs. Exclude computer accounts (ServiceName ending in $) and krbtgt before hunting.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 4769, with the values that matter for investigation.

TargetUserName

Account that requested the service ticket, in user@DOMAIN form.

TargetDomainName

Domain of the requesting account.

ServiceName

Account that runs the service the ticket is for. Computer accounts end in $; a user account here means a service with an SPN on a user — a Kerberoasting target.

ServiceSid

SID of the service account.

TicketOptions

Kerberos ticket options requested (hex).

TicketEncryptionType

Encryption type of the service ticket.

0x11
AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
0x12
AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
0x17
RC4-HMAC — the type Kerberoasting tools ask for.
0x18
RC4-HMAC-EXP
0xffffffff
No ticket issued (failure).
Status

Kerberos result code; 0x0 means the ticket was issued.

IpAddress

Client IP address.

IpPort

Client source port.

LogonGuid

GUID linking this request to the logon (the same GUID appears in the 4624 on the target server).

TransmittedServices

Services involved in delegation (constrained delegation / S4U), otherwise -.

How to enable this event

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Success, Failure). Only meaningful on domain controllers.

Check the effective policy with auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations"; Failure auditing is often not enabled.

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Normal access to file servers, SQL, IIS and other Kerberos services — thousands per hour on busy DCs.
  • Computers requesting tickets to DCs (LDAP, CIFS) for Group Policy processing.
  • Old applications or service accounts configured for RC4 only.

Worth investigating

  • Kerberoasting — one account requesting RC4 (0x17) tickets for many user-account SPNs within minutes (Rubeus, Impacket GetUserSPNs).
  • Targeted Kerberoasting of a single high-value service account, which only stands out through RC4 use or an unusual requesting host.
  • Silver tickets do not produce 4769 at all — a service logon (4624 on the server) with no matching 4769 on any DC is a lead.

Investigation notes

  • Filter ServiceName not ending in $ and not krbtgt, then count distinct ServiceName per TargetUserName and IpAddress per hour.
  • Flag TicketEncryptionType 0x17 where the account supports AES.
  • Check whether the requesting account usually uses those services at all.
  • Pivot to the service accounts involved; if Kerberoasting is confirmed, rotate their passwords and review later logons (4624) by them.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References