Windows Event ID 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested
Event 4769 is logged on domain controllers for every Kerberos service ticket (TGS) request — the key record for spotting Kerberoasting.
Overview
- Event ID
- 4769
- Log / channel
- Security
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- Category
- kerberos
- Enabled by default
- Yes
- How to enable
- Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Success, Failure). Only meaningful on domain controllers.
What event 4769 logs
Event 4769 is written by the KDC on a domain controller when an account that already holds a TGT asks for a ticket to a specific service (a Ticket Granting Service request). Every access to a Kerberos-protected resource — file shares, SQL Server, HTTP with Windows authentication, LDAP, other hosts — produces one.
The ServiceName field shows which service account the ticket is for, and TicketEncryptionType shows how it is encrypted. That combination is how Kerberoasting is found: an attacker requests tickets for user accounts that have an SPN, preferably RC4-encrypted (0x17) because they crack faster offline. Requests like that for many services in a short time, from one account, are the classic signature.
Volume is very high on DCs. Exclude computer accounts (ServiceName ending in $) and krbtgt before hunting.
Fields
Every field recorded in event 4769, with the values that matter for investigation.
TargetUserNameAccount that requested the service ticket, in user@DOMAIN form.
TargetDomainNameDomain of the requesting account.
ServiceNameAccount that runs the service the ticket is for. Computer accounts end in $; a user account here means a service with an SPN on a user — a Kerberoasting target.
ServiceSidSID of the service account.
TicketOptionsKerberos ticket options requested (hex).
TicketEncryptionTypeEncryption type of the service ticket.
- 0x11
- AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
- 0x12
- AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
- 0x17
- RC4-HMAC — the type Kerberoasting tools ask for.
- 0x18
- RC4-HMAC-EXP
- 0xffffffff
- No ticket issued (failure).
StatusKerberos result code; 0x0 means the ticket was issued.
IpAddressClient IP address.
IpPortClient source port.
LogonGuidGUID linking this request to the logon (the same GUID appears in the 4624 on the target server).
TransmittedServicesServices involved in delegation (constrained delegation / S4U), otherwise -.
How to enable this event
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Success, Failure). Only meaningful on domain controllers.
Check the effective policy with auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations"; Failure auditing is often not enabled.
Detection and investigation
Typically benign
- Normal access to file servers, SQL, IIS and other Kerberos services — thousands per hour on busy DCs.
- Computers requesting tickets to DCs (LDAP, CIFS) for Group Policy processing.
- Old applications or service accounts configured for RC4 only.
Worth investigating
- Kerberoasting — one account requesting RC4 (
0x17) tickets for many user-account SPNs within minutes (Rubeus, Impacket GetUserSPNs). - Targeted Kerberoasting of a single high-value service account, which only stands out through RC4 use or an unusual requesting host.
- Silver tickets do not produce 4769 at all — a service logon (4624 on the server) with no matching 4769 on any DC is a lead.
Investigation notes
- Filter ServiceName not ending in
$and notkrbtgt, then count distinct ServiceName per TargetUserName and IpAddress per hour. - Flag TicketEncryptionType
0x17where the account supports AES. - Check whether the requesting account usually uses those services at all.
- Pivot to the service accounts involved; if Kerberoasting is confirmed, rotate their passwords and review later logons (4624) by them.