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Securitylog-integrityEnabled by default

Windows Event ID 1102: The audit log was cleared

Security event 1102 is written when the Security log is cleared, naming the account that did it. Rare in normal operations and a classic anti-forensics sign.

Overview

Event ID
1102
Log / channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
Category
log-integrity
Enabled by default
Yes
How to enable
Always logged by the Windows Event Log service when the Security log is cleared; no audit policy is required.

What event 1102 logs

Event 1102 is written by the Windows Event Log service as the first record of a freshly cleared Security log. It survives the wipe because it is created after it, and it records the account that performed the clear in the UserData/LogFileCleared element: SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid and SubjectLogonId.

There are very few legitimate reasons to clear the Security log on a production system — archival is normally handled by log forwarding or by the retention settings. An analyst who finds a 1102 should treat everything before it as potentially lost and turn to other sources: forwarded copies in a SIEM, other channels on the host, and logs on the machines the account touched.

Clearing other logs (System, Application, PowerShell and so on) is recorded as System event 104, not 1102. Attackers who clear everything usually leave both.

Fields

Every field recorded in event 1102, with the values that matter for investigation.

SubjectUserName

Account that cleared the log.

SubjectDomainName

Domain or computer name of that account.

SubjectUserSid

SID of the account that cleared the log; stable even if the account is renamed.

SubjectLogonId

Logon session that performed the clear. Pivot to the 4624 with the same TargetLogonId on forwarded or other logs to find where the session came from.

How to enable this event

Always logged by the Windows Event Log service when the Security log is cleared; no audit policy is required.

The fields live under UserData/LogFileCleared, not EventData. The clearing account needs the Manage auditing and security log right (administrators have it by default).

Detection and investigation

Typically benign

  • Lab machines, golden images and systems being prepared for deployment, where logs are wiped as part of a build.
  • An administrator clearing a full log on a host configured to not overwrite events (after a 1104).

Worth investigating

  • Covering tracks after intrusion with wevtutil cl Security, PowerShell Clear-EventLog or Remove-EventLog, or Event Viewer's Clear Log action.
  • Ransomware and wipers clearing all event logs just before or after encryption.
  • Clearing the log on a single server after lateral movement, while leaving other hosts intact.

Investigation notes

  • Identify the session: SubjectLogonId and SubjectUserName, then look in forwarded logs or on domain controllers for the logon (4624, 4768/4769, 4776) that created it.
  • Check System event 104 at the same time — several logs cleared together points to a script or tool.
  • Search process creation (4688, Sysmon 1) and PowerShell 4104 around the timestamp for wevtutil, Clear-EventLog or ClearLog calls to identify the executing process.
  • Compare the host's forwarded events with what remains locally to see exactly what was wiped.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Related event IDs

References